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The paper  concerns the connection between different tipologies of business 
ethics (kantian, utilitarian, aristotelic) and the alternative vision of 
economic development, company’s organizational and managerial context 
together with interest in Common Good more or less associated to profit to 
which they have given rise. 
In this comparison virtue ethics stands out for its capacity of creating, 
specially through the business virtue of generosity, social capital so 
precious to economic development at every level, for its capability of 
increasing people’s well-being, and for its capacity to make the production 
of relational goods (among which Common Good), on which people’s 
happiness depends, easier. 
Gift’s paradigm  recovery can also be helpful to prevent other financial and 
economic crisis like the actual one which has had, like less striking but 
deepest cause, the  triumph of avarice’s vice on the virtues of giving 
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The paper is devoted to relate ethics and business with an interdisciplinary 
effort considering that this rejoining is strategic for economic and human 
development. Alternative conceptions of ethics are briefly examined in 
their main characteristics, points of strength and critical aspects (ethics of 
intentions, ethics of consequences, virtue ethics) relating them to the 
philosophical tradition in which they ground (kantian, utilitarian, 
aristotelic) and connecting them to the streams of economic and managerial 
thought (stakeholder managerial approach, neoclassical economics, civil 
economics) and vision of economic development to which these 
philosophical traditions have given origin. 
The paper analyses the various companies’ concepts and finalism with their 
advantages and limits, the different organizational and managerial contexts, 
the different way of conceiving the relations with stakeholders which can 
be generated connecting business to each of these different moral theories. 
The different attitudes to pursue Common Good together with profit are 
also taken into account. 
A connection between “virtue ethics” and “social capital” is also traced 
showing that some of the virtues needed to living in civil society are 
essential also to business, because both work to increase people’s 
cooperation (outside and inside the company). Among the virtues which are 
emblem, in MacIntyre’s words, of human “recognized dependency”, 
special attention is paid to generosity (distinguishing it from other similar 
Thomistical virtues) for its capacity of building social links (inside and 
outside the firm) indispensable to increase company’s competitiveness, of 
being useful to the production of relational goods (among which Common 
Good), of being able to contribute to people’s happiness. This general 
excursus on virtues, and more particularly on business virtues, allows us to 
explain the actual financial and economic crisis with a very different 
perspective (anthropological) from the dominant ones (market failure and 
State failure) and to suggest different remedies for its overcoming, alias 




Though Emmanuel Kant philosopher is often invoked with regard to 
business ethics as an exponent of deontological ethics, until 1999 no 
systematic studies on application of Kantian ethics to business world 
had been published
1. Kant’s rediscovery in this field is rather recent, 
even if of fundamental importance because of his early theorization of 
ethical principles which have hardly asserted themselves in business 
matters and only a long time after their pioneer conceiving by the 
Prussian philosopher in the moral sphere (Bowie, 2002). 
Kant’s moral theory’s essence lies in making the Supreme Good reside 
in someone’s good intentions and in believing that to act according to 
good intentions is the same as acting according to one’s duty. So it is 
good intention which makes an action good more than its 
consequences. This emphasis on duty and the lack of attention to 
action’s consequences make Kantian ethics deontological par 
excellence.  
But which are everyone’s duties according to Kant? Kant distinguishes 
between two kinds of duties (imperatives). Sometimes one must do 
something to obtain something else (for instance: it is necessary  to 
train to become a good  athlete). This is the form of the hypothetical 
imperative: if you want to get something, you ought to do another 
thing.  
Other duties are required per se,  with no ifs, and these correspond to 
the ethical foundations of a society which are requested by Reason 
(categorical imperative). 
Though Kant spoke of categorical imperative in a single way, many 
annotators think that he had formulated it in three main duties, which 
can be summarized in the following sentences (Bowie, 2002): 
1)  act only on laws which can be considered universal laws of nature; 
2)  treat people always like an end, never like a means; 
3)  act as if you were a member of an ideal kingdom of ends in which 




                                                 
1 N.Bowie’s book “Business Ethics: a Kantian Perspective” has quite filled this gap (Bowie, 
1999). 2.2 Act only on the basis of universal laws of nature 
 
The first formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative (act according to 
rules which can be assumed like universal laws of nature) is a test to 
which every action (even in economic field) should be submitted to 
judge its moral acceptability. The example given by Kant to illustrate 
his thesis is exactly of economic nature. He asks himself if it is morally 
permissible, even though someone is really penniless, to ask for a loan 
making the promise of its return, but with the intention of not 
honouring it. Kant says no. The false promise, if universalized (or 
adopted by everyone like a generalized behaviour), would produce a 
widespread lack of confidence which should make the promise no more 
feasible. The false promise would self-destroy in a flash (self-defeating 
nature of immoral actions) (Kant, 1990, p.19). 
So, according to Kant, an action (even economic) can be done only if it 
passes categorical imperative test, alias if it can be done at universal 
level without running into logic contradictions. 
 
2.3 Treat people always like an end, never like a means 
 
Since human beings have free will and thus are able to act on laws 
required by Reason, Kant firmly believed that every person should be 
respected in dignity beyond market value.  
Coherently to this assumption, people should not be instrumentally 
used, inside the company, only to satisfy company’s profit necessities. 
The implications of Kantian “respect for person” principle in economic 
field, put some constraints on the nature of economic transactions, in 
the sense that they must be made with no coercion (physical or moral) 
and no deception and must be arranged as to develop human rational 
and moral capacities instead of inhibiting them. For this view, Kant 
seems to anticipate “positive freedom” concept, which will be 
completely formulated only two centuries after by Indian economist 
A.Sen (Sen, 2000). These moral requirements, if observed,  should 
deeply change company’s organization and management. The 
translation of these moral principles into practice should mean to 
support workers’ creativity and autonomy, to reduce information 
asymmetry between management and employees (through different 
forms of workers’ involvement in company’s management
2) or 
                                                 
2 This involvement can be achieved through different forms of “share economy” 
(information rights, expression of consultative or binding opinions by workers, profit-between customer and company (avoiding deceptive advertising), to 
entertain no despotic relations with supplying companies or sub-
contractors. A style of management inspired to Kantian moral approach 
would conceive work as an activity freely choosen by workers, would 
provide all the opportunities to exercise a full autonomy on the job, 
would pay an adequate salary, would enable workers to develop 
rational capacities, would not interfere with workers’ moral 
development. But as every manager/entrepreneur should treat his 
employees respecting every person’s humanity and dignity, so every 
employee should not conceive the organization in an instrumental way, 
alias like a means to pursue merely individual objectives, and not 
common goals. Naturally the anthropological vision which is at the root 
of the Kantian ethics applied to the firm is optimistic (in advance of 
McGregors’s  “Y Theory” on human resources), because employees are  
described like  persons who want to work in a creative way and are 
willing to take their responsibilities rather than painted like lazy, 
opportunistic and irresponsible fellows (“Theory X” on human 
resources) (McGregor, 1960)
3.               
                                                                                                                
 
2.4 Act as if you were a member of an ideal kingdom of ends in which 
you were both subject and sovereign at the same time      
 
In addition to the moral requirement of human’s dignity respect, an 
other one should be added which comes out from the third formulation 
of categorical imperative. This requests that everybody should act as if 
he/she were a member of an ideal kingdom of ends in which he/she is 
both subject and sovereign at the same time. In organizational terms 
this means that rules must be approved and shared by everyone, though 
they must not clash, in the name of democracy, with the two other 
formulations of categorical imperative. Extending this proposition to 
corporate level requires an active workers’ participation to company’s 
decisions/management/profit/ownership (differently articulated 
according to the degree of evolution of the organizational context) and 
the consideration, in coming to a decision, of the interests of all the 
company’s stakeholders affected by them. So, not only of employees 
and shareholders (and, among these last ones, not only of majority’s 
 
sharing, co-management, co-decision, workers’ share holding).  See Montesi (1993 e 1994) 
and Molesti (2006). 
3 Beyond every opinion ex-ante on human nature, we can notice that it is interdependence 
which rules people’s actions: employees very often behave themselves like employers treat 
them (Bateson, 1976). shareholders), but also  of other people outside the firm
4.  Kant has 
really been a pioneer in throwing the moral seeds for the future growth 
of Corporate Social Responsibility’s notion (in the frame of the 
stakeholder managerial approach). 
Not simply banishing Corporate Social Responsibility only to taking 
into account of the outer effects of company’s actions, but paying also 
a certain attention to the different contributions coming to the company 
from the outside, one may notice that some other moral rules can be 
deduced from the observation of company/environment interaction. 
In recommending, in his Metaphysics of Moral, the obligation of 
beneficence
5, Kant opens new perspectives even in social marketing 
field, due to the fact that if corporations have benefited from society 
(availing themselves of public infrastructures, public services, well-
educated human capital and so on), they have a duty of beneficence to 
society in return, to be carried out through philanthropy. 
In Kantian view a company is a moral community, where each member 
stands in a moral, and not only economic, relation with others and with 
the more enlarged community in which the corporation operates.  
The company’s good does not confine itself to the achievement of 
economic efficiency, but includes workers’ satisfaction and the 
consideration of community’s interests. Company’s good does not 
leave out of its consideration Common Good, which is a “relational 
good” because it is built and enjoyed all together and because it 
belongs to everyone, but also to each single person
6. In the Kantian 
case, anyway, Common Good is guided by the Practical Reason, by 
individual’s response to interior moral law recall (categorical 
imperative), besides the obedience to legal norms. It is an algid 
Common Good, despotically ruled by the Reason, not by sympathetic 
relations among people
7. Kantian vision abhors an authoritarian and 
hierarchical company organization. It demands participation, by all 
corporate’s stakeholders, especially employees, to company’s 
decisions.  
                                                 
4 No particular attention to natural environment can be deduced from Kantian ethics which 
is more unbalanced on paying attention to human beings. 
5 “ …beneficence is a duty that results from the fact that since our self-love cannot be 
separated from our need to be loved by others (to obtain help from them in the case of need), 
we thereby make ourselves an end for others..Hence the happiness of others  is an end which 
is at the same time a duty” (Kant, 1994, p.52). 
6 See Grasselli P. (2008). 
7 That is why Kant, despite of his attention to human dignity, can not be considered the 
inspirer of a vision of economic development in the person’s perspective. See Grasselli P., 
Moschini M. (2007). Kantian ethics, with categorical imperative in its three formulations 
considered together as a coherent whole, provides stimulating 
suggestions to managers in terms of negative injunctions  (no coercion 
and no deception in business activity) and positive ideals  to aim at 
(company’s democratization, meaningful and responsible work, 
corporate social responsibility, social marketing).         
Kant’s critics stigmatize the excessive vagueness of his ethics which,  
in some cases, results of difficult applicability
8.  They also notice that 
his ethics, while requires the inclusion of all company’s stakeholders’ 
interests in the decision process, does not provide rules of solutions of 
possible conflicts emerging among them, because it relies on the 
principle that all individuals have the same moral dignity (Velasquez, 
2002, pp.101-3) (Weiss, 2006, p.125).          
 
 
3. Ethics of Consequences       
 
3.1 Utilitarian Ethics              
 
Utilitarianism can be ascribed to the stream of consequentialist ethical 
theory, according to which an act rightness or wrongness is determined 
solely by act consequences (Snoeyenbos and Humber, 2002).  For 
Utilitarianism an act is morally correct only if it maximizes general 
utility. If this is the guide-criterion, before acting one should: 
1.  set out all the possible alternative actions; 
2.  list all the individuals who could be affected by all the possible  
alternative actions; 
3.  understand how people could be influenced by the alternative 
actions, computing benefits and costs for each individual 
affected by every possible action; 
4.  choose the action which maximizes general utility, alias that 
act which assures, among all people affected by it, the greatest 
positive difference between benefits and costs. 
                                                 
8 Think, for instance, to the application of the first formulation of categorical imperative to 
some concrete situations: “for example, suppose I am a murder: would I then be willing to 
have everyone follow the policy that all murders should be punished? In a sense I would be 
willing to because I would want to be protected from other murders, but in an other sense I 
would not be willing because I do not want to be punished myself. Which sense is correct?” 
(Velasquez, 2002, p.102). 
 
 Utilitarianism distinguishes itself from “pure egoism” (an other 
consequentialist  theory) because, for the latter, an act is morally right if 
and only if it provides the greatest balance of benefit to harm for the subject 
who has performed the action. But Utilitarianism also differs from “pure 
altruism” because altruists do not include themselves in the cost-benefit  
calculation used to choose the best action. 
There is need of further specifications about Utilitarian Ethics: 
1.  what is taken into consideration to maximize general utility is the 
difference between costs and benefits of an action, and not only the 
benefits; 
2.  the differences between costs and benefits of an action must be 
seen not only in the short term, but also in the long term; 
3.  what is maximized is general  utility, but not the number of 
individuals who realize a positive difference between benefits and 
costs of an action. In this view Common Good is the good of 
everybody, but not the good of each individual. 
 
If we apply the moral principles of Utilitarianism at macroeconomic level, 
we can understand the acritical quantitative obsession, derived from them, 
for unlimited growth, with no care of income inequalities (and of 
environmental lack of balance) which can be generated by the more or less 
accelerated development processes. 
In economic horizon, concept of utility has progressively evolved. 
At the very beginning of its theorization, utility identified itself exclusively 
with pleasure (hedonistic theory)
9, then with other components of well-
being (pluralistic theory), finally with individual’s preferences (preference 
theory). All these theoretical passages have been necessary because of the 
many calculation problems that the hedonistic theory showed 
                                                 
9 Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) makes utility coincide with pleasure and finds some criteria 
to order pleasures (Bentham, 1789). He says that pleasure P1 is greater than P2  if  P1 is: 
1.  more intensive than P2; 
2.  of greater duration than P2; 
3.  of more certain realization than P2; 
4.  nearer in time than P2; 
5.  such that it will lead to other pleasures that P2  does not lead to; 
6.  purer, or less mixed with pain, than P2; 
7.  such that more people can realize it than P2. 
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) further developed Bentham’s former “hedonistic calculus” 
assigning numeric values to some pleasures’s dimensions (duration and intensity) and 
ranking different pleasures according to an order of qualitative importance, and weighing 
them numerically (Mill, 1957). For a comparison between Bentham’s and Mill’s concept of 
pleasure see Nussbaum (2007), pp.4-5. (measurement of intensity and duration of pleasure, determination of the 
criteria for classification of pleasures), which had become even greater in 
pluralistic theory. At the end, pleasure has been replaced by the more 
objective category of preference which has been assumed, by the 
neoclassical economic theory, as the basis to explain the functioning of 
economic systems. This has implied a further theoretical slipping: the 
egoistic adrift of Utilitarianism. 
Infact together with the assertion of “homo oeconomicus” paradigma  (an 
agent fully informed, self-interested, moved only by extrinsic motivations, 
who wants to maximize his preferences satisfaction), the main economic 
problem to solve becomes the maximization of individual utility
10. 
In this theoretical frame, Common Good reduces itself to be the 
unintentional outcome of individual actions, all aimed to obtain the best for 
oneself (Adam Smith‘s “invisible hand”). In this case Common Good is 
unknown. It is infact the result of competition meant like a “discovery 
procedure”
11. 
In this context company represents only a coordination of productive 
factors, which must not bother about Common Good, because it can be 
achieved unconsciously and indirectly through profit maximization 
(Friedman, 1979). 
Utilitarianism, in its more recent formulation, has had a great success in 
business ethics sphere, and it is actually the prevailing moral philosophy 
applied to economics, having shown to be very durable and resilient. 
Due to the fact that it is a consequentialist ethics, it has a strong plausibility 
(and, so forth, a large acceptance by companies) because of its emphasis on 
results. 
It has also the advantage of justifying a high management’s flexibility 
which is very appropriate in case of great variability and instability of 
markets and at the presence of high geographical differentiation of markets. 
Utilitarianism infact, always starting from an objective evaluation of the 
consequences of an act, does not allow to consider any regulation 
inviolable by principle, but permits to breaking the rules with a certain 
                                                 
10 Alain Caillè distinguishes between recent Utilitarianism, incarnated in standard economic 
science which requires men to become only selfish calculating machines, and Bentham’s 
Utilitarianism which entails the sacrifice of individuals’ egoistic interests to the respect of 
the interests of the greatest number of persons (“moralism of sacrifice” of Bentham’s 
Utilitarianism). See Salsano (2008), pp.46-8. 
11 Hayek defines competition like “a procedure for discovering facts which, if the procedure 
did not exist, would remain unknown or at least would not be used” (Hayek, 2002, p.9). 
According to Hayek competition’s results are unforeseeable and totally different from those 
that someone would have consciously preferred. nonchalance according to the mutability of circumstances and to the variety 
of context, alias when the maximization of utility requires it. 
Critics of Utilitarianism maintain that there are some rules (like promise-
keeping) whose importance in economic field can not be relativized, if one 
does not want to destroy the moral tissue which is the catalyst of the market 
exchanges. Other critics fear the risk of no respect of individuals’ rights 
inside a company managed according to an Utilitarian vision.  
Some others allege that Utilitarianism, because of its reductionist vision of 
Common Good like a total good and not like a relational good, permits 
social injustice (Velasquez, 2002, pp.83-5). 
 
 
4. Ethics of Virtue                                                    
 
4.1 From heroic to civil virtues 
 
The business ethics examined till now, concentrate their attention either on 
action principles, on their universality and justification (ethics of 
intentions) or on action effects with relative benefits and harms (ethics of 
consequences). Between these two opposite poles there is a third option, 
Ethics of Virtue. This ethics tends to focus on the agent, on the person who 
performs the action, on those traits of his/her character which  express 
his/her virtues which condition their actions (Solomon, 2002). 
So what is more important to exercise a virtue is the individual’s character, 
in addition to the social and cultural context in which the virtue is 
performed (Darwall, 2003). 
But virtue ethics raises an anthropological question. The virtues to be 
preferred depend on which “ideal model” of man is adopted in a given 
society at a certain time. 
Virtues infact may vary according to excellence models shared in a society. 
Virtues are those individual’s qualities which reflect the exemplarity of a 
social role
12 and allow someone to do what the social role requires
13. 
This definition naturally raises the charge of moral relativism, because 
virtues can be very different from a society to an other (the Homeric hero
14 
                                                 
12 In “heroic” societies, social roles, with their duties and privileges, were well-defined and 
fixed (because of the inexistence of social mobility), together with the necessary actions to 
accomplish the tasks linked to social standing, actions which needed special virtues 
celebrated and requested only in that context. 
13 “…The virtues are simply those qualities which support a free man in his role and which 
appear in the actions required by his role” (MacIntyre, 2007, p.160). is very different from the V century B.C. Athenian aristocrat or from the 
Samurai of feudal Japanese society of XII century A.D.) and become 
obsolete
15. 
Anyway we can single out a “hard core” of virtues which are fundamental 
in every society and time. 
These virtues are those which refer to human kind and not to a pre-
determined social role
16  and are those qualities which are necessary to 
reach an indispensable end for every society: to get along well together. 
Are those virtues which are of great use not only to create and consolidate 
human society, but , more ambitiously, “to live a good life”. 
In this horizon virtues are those individuals’ characteristics which  permit 
the peaceful and active belonging to a community
17. For this reason some 
authors call them “cooperative virtues” to distinguish them from those 
“competitive” of Homeric derivation (Adkins, 1960). To be virtuous is the 
same to be a good citizen; it is the pólis and no more the aristocratic family 
the place where virtues must be identified and exercised. To conclude we 
can say that virtues are those  qualities of character which favour Common 
Good’s achievement. 
The separation of  the concept of virtue from social role and the discovery 
and celebration of the virtues necessary to civil living has been due to 
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), for whom sincere friendship
18 and citizenship
19 
are essential aspects of human and communitarian life as he has argued in 
his Etica Nicomachea. 
                                                                                                                 
14 In Homeric society, in addition to physical energy, courage is one of the more desiderable 
virtues, not only as a quality of individuals, but also as a quality which is necessary to keep 
up one’s family’s reputation and friendship’s relations. To friendship loyalty is equally 
precious. Cunning is indispensable where courage lacks or fails or is not sufficient. 
15 “..Every ethics is always linked to a dimension socially local and peculiar, and 
modernity’s yearning for an universality delivered from every peculiarity is an illusion” 
(MacIntyre, 2007, p.165). “There are too many different and inconsistent conceptions of 
virtues that a real unity of the concept cannot exist” (MacIntyre, 2007, p.225). 
16 In heroic societies for instance prevailed a notion of virtue meant like physical capabilities 
regarding man in the guise of warrior and athlete  (corresponding to the social role 
requested) and not concerning man itself. See Pagani (2007), p.27. 
17 Though if  less conditioned by the social roles of heroic societies of IX century B.C., the 
virtues necessary to “civil living” show, anyway, little changes and different interpretations 
varying according to times and places. That is why MacIntyre speaks of “Athenian” more 
than “Greek” vision of civil virtues. 
18 Aristotle divides friendship in three different kinds: one which derives from mutual 
advantage, an other one which comes from mutual pleasure, and the last which emerges 
from a common interest for goods which are relational, alias of both the subjects involved in 
the friendship’s relation. Only this last one is genuine (MacIntyre, 2007, p.200). 
19 According to Aristotle virtues are prerogatives only of free men who belong to the State-
town, and not of slaves or foreigners. In describing virtues, Aristotle followed Athenian society of his time or, at 
least, its idealized version (Aristotle, 1979). 
A virtue (aretè which can also be translated as “excellence”) for Aristotle is 
“the mean between the extremes” (mesótes), each of those is a vice dictated 
by irrational impulse.  
An example of virtue is courage (between cowardice and recklessness), 
temperance (neither gluttory nor prudishness), prudence (between 
incautiousness and caution), justice (between giving neither too much nor 
too little on merit basis), generosity (between prodigality and avarice). 
Notion of virtue anyway does not reduce itself only to the solution of the 
problem of extreme passions moderation through a “monarchic and not 
despotic” control of them by means of reason
20. 
Many other virtues reside in those individuals’ characteristics which 
promote sociability, like true friendship ( philía),  sense of humour and 
amiability. To these virtues of practise, which can be gained by wonted 
excercise
21, are strictly connected, in mutual support, intellectual virtues, 
which can be  acquired through systematic education. Without phrónesis, 
which is the capacity of formulating rational judgment according to 
circumstances, is not possible to decide what is right or wrong to do in a 
certain situation, though the action will also depend on the other virtues 
which compose the character of a person. With the aid of both tipologies of 
virtues (practical and intellectual), people try to let all person’s traits live 
together in harmony, without removing passions or dominating them 
violently, but controlling them with wisdom. 
 
4.2 Business virtues 
 
The business virtues should be those individual’s qualities which serve the 
achievement of success in economic field
22. The economic success depends 
infact on the cooperation with people inside and outside the company 
(employees, customers, suppliers, etc.). For this reason the characteristics 
which promote sociability, so important in the communitarian sphere, 
should be just as precious in the economic sphere. Besides if we want to do 
business in consonance with society, alias with objectives shared not only 
inside the company, but also outside, business virtues should be, mostly, 
the same essential to civil living. 
                                                 
20 See Pagani, 2007, p.27. 
21 In addition to regular exercise, to acquire practical  virtues is also important the 
contribution given by the laws of the State. 
22  Business virtues should not be confused with business skills, alias with the specific 
capabilities necessary to manage an activity (for instance the manual ability of a craftsman). So, the business virtues should be those characteristics which consent to 
managers and entrepreneurs to build a corporate citizen without destroying 
the civil tissue in which the company operates. 
In this way a company can be conceived like a social community which acts 
in fine tuning with a wider community. According to this view company’s 
good and Common Good are tied up. If corporate’s activity must be 
exercised so that to save social capital inside and outside the company 
(because social capital is a prior requisite for its start up and a necessity for 
its easy functioning), the business virtues to be preferred should not be 
those of Nietzsche’s derivation
23, which aim to take one’s distance from 
society, but those which do not tear work relations, team working, market 
exchanges, and strengthen social and economic links. 
Reliability, meant like to keep one’s word and honesty
24 imaged like truth 
telling attitude, are two basilar virtues for every market exchange stipulated 
in any society, because they consolidate trustful relations and, in this way, 
enforce contracts. 
Besides reliability and honesty, other Aristotelian virtues like courage, 
temperance, prudence, justice, generosity can also be added to business 
virtues if interpreted in managerial key. 
Courage can be declined in different ways: risk taking capacity, 
resoluteness in company’s activity in presence of threats or business 
difficulties. 
Temperance refers to have a reasonable set of expectations and desires, 
without being overwhelmed by lustful passions, like greed, which becomes 
the origin of lies, deceptions, dishonest behaviour. 
Prudence is the capacity of being able to ascertain and decide what is right 
or wrong to do in certain company’s circumstances (Pagani, 2007, p.31)
25. 
                                                 
23 In contrast to Aristotle, F.Nietzsche (1844-1900) lists like virtues those traits which are 
useful to differenziate as more as possible from the mass, getting rid of Christian virtues. If  
we transfer this conception to business sphere, Nietzsche’s virtues could be risk-taking 
capacity, independence, creativity. In this last characteristic we can see the typical qualities 
of the innovative entrepreneur (of Schumpeter’s memory) who breaks the business routines, 
without caring of the possible destruction, during the innovative process, of the basic virtues 
necessary to maintain civil the economic milieu. Naturally, a person could have both virtues 
(Aristotelian and Nietzschian), but Aristotle thought it was improbable, because  of his 
“unity of virtues” thesis. This was the ancient platonic idea that the various virtues support 
and reinforce one another and do not come to conflict, in a life’s harmony. Nietzsche, on the 
other hand, argued that virtues are often at war each other in the same person. 
24 Honesty is important not only in stipulation and observance of contracts, but also in 
advertising. 
25 Adam Smith (1711-1776), moral philospher and father of Political Economy, exalted for 
market’s good functioning, the virtue of prudence, union of reason, self-control and 
practical sense (Smith, 1977) (Sen, 1999, pp.22-3) (Montesi, 2000, p.35). He also “Recta ratio agibilium”, alias “the right reason of what to do”, does not 
exhaust itself in mixing pragmatically reason (though limited by external 
complexity) and action, but enlightens action also with judgment of 
conscience. 
Justice turns into the attention to “acknowledge and honour the meaning of 
the different presences in relation to which our existence is led” (Pagani, 
2007, p.31). Practically is the virtue of rewarding collaborators according to 
their merits
26, alias according to their capacity of contributing to the 
company’s common good and goals. 
Generosity is the capacity of create/consolidate human relations through 
gift, facilitating market functioning and company’s operations, on the side 





Virtue of Generosity, whose importance has always been banished from 
economics because of Utilitarianism
28, has recently been appreciated as a 
very precious virtue in business because of some motivations (Montesi 
2007, Montesi 2008). The first motivation is the fact that generosity is the 
virtue that the famous philosopher MacIntyre defines as “the virtue of the 
recognized dependency” (MacIntyre, 2001, p.118), alias is the virtue which 
allows us to live well, like rational animals in mutual interdependence, in 
the different communities to which everyone belongs (families, and other 
social, religious, political, business communities). This happens because, 
according to the gift relational interpretation
29, gift creates and feeds 
                                                                                                                 
emphasized the virtue, central in Stoicism,  of compassion which, converted in economic 
terms in benevolence, could lock up individuals to a corpus of rules richier than the 
traditional merchants’ moral code, based principally on reliability and honesty  (Smith, 
1975). 
26 This is the case of distributive justice, very different from commutative justice, which 
concerns contracts and requires equivalence in exchange. 
27 On gift’s role in companies see Montesi (2008), pp.95-9. Gift is also the activity which 
founds some kinds of non profit organizations which produce relational goods. 
28 Gift has always been investigated in primis by anthropologists and ethnologists and only 
later by sociologists and psycologists. Economists, except rare but laudable studies recently 
appeared (mostly concerning non profit sector’s analysis seen like an exception to market’s 
rules), have kept generosity (like happiness) out of their research because economics can not 
consider, inside its foundative paradigma, those behaviours which are not self-interested. 
For Utilitarianism gifts can not exist (because unselfish actions can not exist) or they are 
only hyprocrisy (because there is always a selfish interest in behaving altruistically). In the 
first case gift is only a loss and a sacrifice, in the second only an instrument in service of 
individual interest. 
29 See Caillè (1998) and Godbout (1993). personal relations. Gift is infact a perpetual and universal catalyst of social 
ties (acquiring in this task also a symbolic value) because it implies 
reciprocity, at a more or less generalized level
30, though reciprocity is free, 
differently from what happens in archaic gift where to give back is a duty, 
and differently from market exchange, where equivalence and the 
obligatory enforcement of the contract reign supreme
31. 
Gift  founds communities and lets them function in the sense that, through 
gift, individuals try to become “domesticated” one onother
32. 
Extending this relational concept from a social to an ethical horizon, gift 
has been assumed by some philosophers not only as the foundation of 
associative life, but also of human existence, alias like person’s substratum, 
whose essence is a high relational capacity and the attitude of being open-
hearted to others
33. 
In this sense gift becomes, through its acknowledgment/gratitude 
mechanism
34, the possibility of thinking and getting in touch with people in 
terms of Alter and a means to build one’s identity. If again we make gift 
relational conception take an other jump from ethical to economic level, we 
notice that it can be conceived, in an innovative way, like an act which can 
lubricate the market and company’s functioning because, while it reinforces 
social links, it creates an atmosphere of trust more favourable to 
transactions and to information and knowledge passage, as MAUSS
35 
exponents have shown, together with the “civil economics” promoters
36 
and the theorists of social capital and local productive systems. 
                                                
 
4.4  Virtues of Giving: generosity, justice, charity, mercy 
 
The prince virtue of giving is generosity, but we must distinguish it from 
justice  (cardinal virtue according St.Thomas
37), from charity (supreme 
 
30 In addition to symmetric reciprocity, there is also generalized reciprocity which can 
assume the form of network reciprocity (like blood’s donation) or open chain reciprocity 
(like in inheritance). See Montesi (2007), pp.75-6. 
31 See Zamagni (1997) and Montesi (2000), pp.37-8. 
32 Think of the gift like war’s substitute discovered by anthropologists in archaic societies 
characterized by the triple obligation of giving, receiving and giving back. Competition 
moves from arms to generosity (rivalistic gift). So gift has a social and political function: it 
transforms enemies in allies. See Mauss (1923), Bourdieu (1987), Caillè (2008). 
33 See Ricoeur (1993) and  Grasselli, Moschini (2007). 
34 See Ricoeur (2005). 
35 Mauss is the famous Anti-Utilitarianism Movement of Social Science founded by Alain 
Caillè. 
36 See Bruni and Zamagni (2004). 
37 St.Thomas, who revises Aristotle’s virtue ethics in a Christian perspective in the sense 
that man’s ultimate end is not only to live in this world according to Reason, but to rejoin teological virtue in Thomistical conception), from mercy (virtue of less 
importance, maid of charity, in Thomistical perspective). 
Generosity is different from justice because it is a form of giving 
spontaneous and with no calculation;  justice on the contrary is a form of 
giving obligatory and calculating. Justice means infact to reward someone 
according to what is due to him, alias “suum cuique tribuere” (distributive 
justice) or in conformity with equivalence respect (commutative justice). 
Generosity is also different from charity because it is a free giving, in a 
relation in which is very important the identity of the partners of the 
donation; it is a free giving with an expectation of return, but without 
having, in the very moment of giving, the warranty of reciprocity. Giving 
on behalf of generosity creates or makes social relations stronger, provided 
the freedom in giving and reciprocating. 
Charity is a free giving too, but it is a gift characterized by no reciprocity 
and made in a generic and impersonal relation. It is a form of giving based 
on kind-hearted discretionality, on anonymous relations like those of 
exchange in force on markets. It is a gift which does not build social 
relations, being an unilateral act with no hope of restituition, which is 
hinged on methodological individualism (like market exchange to which it 
should theoretically oppose
38). It is the  gift proper of the philanthropist 
who does something good for others, but not with others. It is a gift which 
does not presuppose return and so forth neither neighbours’s 
emancipation
39, which does not build fraternity, but only solidarity. It is the 
gift that more remind us of the figure of the Aristotelian megalopsychós 
(the magnanimous), the one that can be proud only of his own gifts, 
specially from a quantitative point of view
40. 
                                                                                                                 
God in life after death, identifies four cardinal virtues (of Aristotelian origin) which are 
natural virtues: prudence, justice (which has generosity and gratefulness in the guise of 
maids), courage (which has magnanimity at its dependence), temperance. In addition to 
these cardinal virtues, there are theological virtues, unknown to Aristotle, which are fruit of 
divine Grace: faith, hope and charity (which has mercy like its minor articulation). Other 
virtues exalted in Medieval times, very distant from Aristotle conception, are: humility, 
patience, purity. 
38 Charity is the kind of gift which is nearer to “pure altruism”, being an act totally 
disinterested (not moved by the calculating reason), gratuitous (performed with no hope of 
return), unilateral (it proceeds one-way from donor to donee), discontinous (being isolated). 
These gift’s characteristics are so heroic to become true that some philosophers have 
theorized its ontological impossibility. See Derrida (1996), Marion (2001).  
39 See MacIntyre, 2001, p.216. 
40 See MacIntyre, 2001, p.125 and Russell, 1979, pp.184-5. Mercy, alias man’s capacity of being sorry for others’ pains as if they were 
his own, extends charity in the direction of a universalization of free, but 
anonymous, gifts to strangers
41. 
In the name of mercy there is the gift to those who do not belong to the 
community (think of the gift of hospitality given to foreigners or of the gift 
made to enemies like in the good Samarian parable) or the gift to those who 
are not present yet (think of the gift of environmental goods to posterity). 
But what makes once more the difference between generosity and charity 
and mercy is that generosity is a virtue, not a sentiment. 
It is not a feeling of love for our fellowmen (horizontal charity) infused in 
human beings by divine Grace, as St.Thomas maintains, or innate like 
Enlightenment thinkers assert
42, neither the pale shade of God’s sublime 
love for us (agápe), which can not be returned because of divine sacrifice 
disparity (vertical charity)
43. 
This difference explains why generosity, unlike charity, must be 
laboriously gained; it is infact not congenital neither transfused, but it 
derives from determined will, from personal commitment, from selfish 
instinct control, from exercising sacrifice (habitus), from constant training, 
from education to Common Good. 
 
4.5 Virtues of Receiving 
 
Gift is not an isolated act, but can be divided into three moments (to give, 
to receive, to reciprocate) deferred in time
44. This is why is important to 
mention also receiving virtues. These, like generosity, make communities 
have more cohesion because they are expression of true acknowledgment 
of dependency from others. Among them virtues appear “like being able to 
show gratitude, without let gratitude be a weight, politeness to those who 







                                                 
41 Freedom to give and anonymous giving are two characteristics of contemporary gift in 
comparison with archaic gift. 
42 This is the case of sympathy feeling, similar to mercy, maintained by Hume and Smith or 
of benevolence theorized by Hutcheson and Shaftesbury. 
43 See Boltansky (1990). 
44 See Godbout, 1993, p.125. 
45 See MacIntyre, 2001, p.125. 4.6 Generosity, Person and Common Good 
 
A second reason to give prominence to the virtue of generosity, in addition 
to the positive consequences, seen before, correlated to being “the virtue of 
the recognized dependency”,  is that it allows us to act in a better way to get 
relational goods easier. These peculiar goods rise infact from a relation 
between two subjects and have the characteristic of being co-produced and 
co-consumed (Gui, 2002), as in the case of Common Good
46. So relational 
goods require a close cooperation with others, differently from private 
goods (rival and exclusive) which presume competition with other people, 
from public goods (not rival, not exclusive) which presuppose indifference 
to others, from common goods (rival, but not exclusive) which  subtend, for 
their wise management, collaboration with others, even if less intensive 
than in relational goods. From this statement, one can hypothesize a new 
ethical tripod
47, based on an inner synergic work of relational symmetries, 










                                  GIFT                      COMMON GOOD 
 
The person-gift connection is immediate: a person is a fellow in relation 
with other; gift in creating/reinforcing social links, make this human 
connatural characteristic stronger. 
The person-Common Good connection is obvious too: Common Good is a 
relational good which can be built and enjoyed together; the person, on its 
                                                 
46 See Grasselli, 2008, p.1. Common Good can be included in the category of relational 
goods because it derives from personal relations among people who contribute  chorally to 
build it and who enjoy it all together. Other examples of relational goods are true friendship, 
love, political participation, some tipologies of services to persons. See also Grasselli 
(2009), p.14. 
47 A reference must be made to Ricoeur’s ethical tripod. His tripod, which is a connotation 
of the person, is composed of self-esteem, solicitude towards people, life led together and 
for Common Good, in the frame of fair institutions (Ricoeur, 1993). peculiar characteristic (sociability and solicitude towards people), becomes 
premise and vector for the realization of Common Good. 
The  gift-Common Good connection is as direct as the other two seen 
before: gift establishes and strengthens communities, works for “good life” 
and so forth for Common Good. Through generosity, alias through sacrifice 
of part of one’s own interest for general purposes, it becomes easier to 
build Common Good which requires, being a relational good, cooperation 
among actors
48. 
A third motivation to give the right importance to the virtue of generosity is 
that it improves life quality, because of gift/happiness connection. 
Happiness is a relational good: “there is no happiness without others”
49. 
Gift in creating/reinforcing social ties concurs to human happiness. One 
must also notice that gift giving, in the case of non conventional gifts not 
dictated by social norms, makes people happy, because gift corresponds to 
donor’s and donee’s personality. Gift making is infact an important 
moment of self-individualization and of others’ acknowledgment. And the 
wish of acknowledgment is a need of identity which can not be suppressed 
in human being, but satisfied through gift. 
Business virtues celebration, and among them, generosity exaltation  must 
not omit their fragility
50, in the awareness that: “to talk in an abstract way 
of virtues is easy, but to practise them requires ductility and comprehension 
of infinite complexity of human matters: a comprehension which can be 
acquired experimenting life’s conflicts personally”
51. 
This advice could also be extended to economic life conflicts which are, in 
many cases, harder and more dilemmatic. 
 
                                                 
48 Montesquieu (1689-1755) in his work “Laws’ spirit” paints virtue like free and conscious 
citizen’s expression in democratic republic, who sacrifices his own interest for community’s 
and nation’s good, while pride is the emblem of the absolute monarchic political regime and 
fear of despotic government (Ravasi, 2005, p.28). 
49 See Todorov, 1998, p.179. Todorov is quoted in Bruni L. (2002), L’Economia e i 
paradossi della felicità, in Sacco P.L., Zamagni S. (a cura di) (2002), Complessità 
relazionale e comportamento economico. Materiali per un nuovo paradigma di razionalità, 
Il Mulino, Bologna, p.175. 
50 Virtue ethics has some points of weakness. For some critics it is not able to solve some 
ethical delicate dilemmas  because it does not provide general rules of conduct. Virtue ethics 
focuses mainly on long-term characteristics of a person, so it risks of  discharging wrong 
acts done occasionally by individuals on the assumption that they could be behaviour’s 
freaks only temporary. Besides the most important traits of a person’s character are not 
constant, but may vary in time. 
51 See Ravasi, 2005, p.120. 5. Conclusion 
 
This general excursus on virtues, and more particularly on business virtues, 
could sound extremely theoretic and out of date. Really it is not, because it 
allows us to explain the actual financial and economic crisis with a very 
different perspective from the dominant ones and to suggest different 
remedies for its overcoming. The crisis has mostly been explained both in 
terms of financial market failure (due to opportunism of financial operators, 
existence of informative asymmetries between customers and financial 
operators, excessive financialization of the economy in the passage from 
industrial to share value capitalism which has made finance completely 
self-referring, creation of collateralized debt obligations linked to uncertain 
sub-prime loans) and in terms of State failure (financial deregulation) to be 
mended respectively with market and institutional formulas (Morris, 2008). 
But the most remote and deepest causes of the crisis are anthropological 
(Zamagni, 2009a). It is the “homo oeconomicus” paradigma with its myths, 
in primis the myth of efficientism (not efficiency’s)
52, which has 
transformed the market from civil and free to greed. 
The economic mainstream which has incarnated this paradigma has 
legitimated and justified the adoption of some human behaviour marked by 
the research, with no limits, of easy capital gains through hazardous 
speculations.  
Avarice’s vice has kicked business virtues (like reliability, honesty, 
temperance, generosity) out of the market and has let very precious 
resource, like trust, so hardly accumulated, be destroyed in a moment 
transforming market euphoria into panic and generating the financial and 
economic crisis. 
Avarice, at the very beginning of capitalism, has been revalued like a vice 
more harmless than lust or thirst for power and glory (Hirschman, 1993) 
(Zamagni, 2009b). 
Really avarice is, like pride, radix omnium malorum. Avarice is source of 
fraud, treachery, violence because its purpose is to steal to others, with 
every means and strategy, to worship money. But it is also the more anti-
social vice because it is opposed to justice and generosity. If this additional 
interpretation of the phenomenon is true, the cure to get out of the crisis 
consists also in “homo reciprocans” paradigma’s recovery (Caillè, 1998). 
The three forms of regulation (market exchange, gift, autority) have always 
be connected in variable mix according ages (Polanyi, 1974; Cella, 1997). 
                                                 
52 Efficientism interprets efficiency like an end in itself, not like a means adopted 
not to waste resources in the process of economic choice. So what must be done is to re-balance the actual equilibrium, which sees 
the supremacy of market exchange on gift/reciprocity and on welfare state, 
in favour of a greater role of reciprocity to mitigate rapacity and its 
dangerous effects (Zamagni, 2009c) and to restore an atmosphere more 
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